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Abstract—Finite-time stability of networked control systems
under Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are investigated in this
paper, where the communication between the plant and the
controller is compromised at some time intervals. Toward this
goal, first an event-triggered mechanism based on the variation
rate of the Lyapunov function is proposed such that the closed-
loop system remains finite-time stable (FTS) and at the same
time, the amount data exchange in the network is reduced.
Next, the vulnerability of the proposed event-triggered finite-
time controller in the presence of DoS attacks are evaluated
and sufficient conditions on the DoS duration and frequency
are obtained to assure the finite-time stability of the closed-loop
system in the presence of DoS attack where no assumption on the
DoS attack in terms of following a certain probabilistic or a well-
structured periodic model is considered. Finally, the efficiency of
the proposed approach is demonstrated through a simulation
study.
Keywords: Finite-time convergence, Input-to-state stability, Ho-
mogeneous systems, Denial-of-Service, Networked control sys-
tems, Event-triggered control
I. INTRODUCTION
INDUSTRIAL control systems are typically equipped withinformation-sharing and communication facilities for the
transmission of measurement and control data. However, wire-
less networks and the Internet, as the key components of such
control systems, are prone to disruption and cyber attacks.
This is more challenging in large-scale networked control
systems and, particularly, in recent emerging context of Cyber-
Physical-Systems (CPS) [1] and Internet-of-Things (IoT). In
this direction, cyber-security is a recent topic of interest in the
literature [2]–[10], where different attack detection/mitigation
strategies along with resilient control approaches are evaluated
to guarantee a safe and secure operation of the closed-loop
system despite the presence of failure, disruption of service,
or possible malicious attacks.
A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS attack) refers to a type
of cyber-attack in which the attacker aims to make network
resources unavailable to users by disrupting the services of
a host connected to the Internet or the network. DoS is
typically made by flooding the targeted channel or resource
with redundant requests to overload the system and prevent
authorized requests to be accomplished. Similarly, in a Dis-
tributed Denial-of-Service attack (DDoS attack), the incoming
traffic flooding the targeted resource comes from many dif-
ferent sources, including targeted online password guessing
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[11]. This effectively makes it impossible to stop the attack
simply by blocking a single source. In networked control
systems, DoS and DDoS have two similar consequences on
the data transmission between the controller and the plant,
namely long delay jitters and large amount of packet loss
[12] and the only difference between DoS and DDoS is
on how they are deployed by the attacker where in DoS
attack only one computer and one internet connection is
used to flood the targeted system while in DDoS multiple
computers and internet connections are utilized for attacking
the targeted system. However, in terms of their ultimate effects
on networked control systems, they have similar behavior.
Motivation: According to [10], security of CPS is a critical
issue which differs from general computing systems in the
sense that any cyber-attack including DoS may cause disrup-
tion in the underlying physical system. For example, in this
paper, we consider sampled-data control systems in which the
plant-controller communication channel is subject to DoS (or
DDoS). This may cause instability in the closed-loop systems
due to denied communication on the control input channel
(controller to actuator) and the measurement channel (sensor
to controller), and in turn, it may result in critical damages to
the physical system. While some works assume the DoS attack
follows a probability distribution [13], here we are concerned
with the deterministic conditions under which the closed-loop
finite-time stability is preserved.
The main motivation of this paper is to investigate the
vulnerability of finite-time stability of networked control sys-
tems and to obtain sufficient conditions on the frequency
and duration of DoS/DDoS attack such that the closed-loop
networked control system remains finite-time stable. It should
be noted that the proposed approach/framework is not con-
sidered as a mitigation solution and DoS/DDoS mitigation
is mainly addressed by designing a secure architecture to
protect a given networked control system from DoS/DDoS
attack which is mainly a computer network problem handled
by IT/computer engineering experts. However, in this paper,
we are considering the problem from the control engineering
perspective and the worst case scenario is analyzed in which
the attacker has successfully launched a DoS/DDoS attack on a
networked control system and we mainly investigate the attack
effects on the finite-time stability of the closed-loop system.
Literature review: DoS attacks within the framework of
linear systems under state-feedback is considered in [14]
where a sampling strategy is proposed to ensure the expo-
nential input-to-state stability in the presence of DoS. Their
approach adopts event-triggered sampling methods, as in [15],
[16], that properly constrain the closed-loop trajectories to
assure the closed-loop stability. Such event-triggered control
scenarios are prevalent in literature, e.g. see [17]–[23], to ac-
count for limited network resources such as limited bandwidth
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2in wireless networks. In [17], output-based resilient design
conditions are developed such that the resulting closed-loop
nonlinear Lipschitz system is input-to-output stable, where in
[19] global exponential stability of networked control systems
under DoS is considered. Triggering control techniques to
ensure asymptotic stability of linear systems under well-
structured periodic [18], energy-constrained [20], and Pulse-
Width Modulated (PWM) DoS attacks [21] are also addressed
in the literature. Game-theoretic approaches assuming an intel-
ligent jammer are also considered in [24], [25] where in [24]
a threshold-strategy is addressed, while the jamming attack
occurs whenever the system state is larger than a specific
threshold. In [25], an energy-constrained jamming scenario
based on the full knowledge of the system state is considered.
Contribution: This paper aims to characterize the duration
and frequency of the DoS attack under which the closed-
loop system remains finite-time stable. Unlike [26], [27] in
which a probabilistic packet drop model is considered for
the DoS attack and similar to [14], [17], [19], no restricting
assumption on the attack strategy is considered here. The
main contribution of this work is to relate the finite-time
stability properties to the duration and frequency of DoS on/off
transitions. As compared to asymptotic stability of linear [14],
[18], [20], [21] and Lipschitz nonlinear [17], [19] systems,
for finite-time stability the underlying nonlinear system needs
to be non-Lipschitz at the origin (or equilibrium point) [28]–
[30]. Such finite-time protocols, initially introduced in optimal
control literature [31], are of interest due to reducing the
response time [32] and forcing the system to reach the desired
target in finite-time [33].
In this paper, using the results governing the finite-time
input-to-state stable (FTISS) systems and adopting an event-
triggered mechanism that suitably constrains the system tra-
jectories, a Lyapunov-based analysis is developed to assure the
finite-time stability under DoS attack. Particularly, we derive
the bound on DoS on/off transitions such that the stability
during the off-periods of DoS dominates the instability during
the on-periods of DoS, where during the on-periods of DoS the
open-loop system evolves using the most recent transmitted
control signal. There is no constraint on the control input
during the off-periods of DoS and any type of state-feedback
control design, e.g. robust control, can be considered. Note
that the event-triggered mechanism is designed in accordance
with the variation rate of the Lyapunov function and managing
the sampling rate accordingly ensures the resiliency of our
method, and further, allows for sufficiently flexible design to
account for communication resources. Finally, the performance
of the proposed approach is demonstrated and compared with
a relevant work in the literature through a simulation study.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
A. Finite-time Input-to-State Stability
Consider a nonlinear system in the form:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0, (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, and u(t) ∈ Rm represent the system state
and the system input, respectively. Considering a closed-loop
feedback controller u(t) = ψ(x(t), e(t)) where e(t) represent
the closed-loop error signal due sampling, one can rewrite the
closed-loop system as:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), ψ(x(t), e(t))) = F (x(t), e(t)), x(0) = x0. (2)
First, we formally define the finite-time stability and finite-
time input-to-state stability properties of the closed-loop sys-
tem and the required conditions in terms of Lyapunov stability.
Definition 1. The equilibrium x = 0 of system (2) with e(t) =
0 is finite-time stable (locally) if it is locally stable in the
Lyapunov sense and for any initial time t0 and initial state
x(t0) = x0 ∈ V with V as a nonempty neighborhood of the
origin in Rn, there exists a settling-time function T (x0) such
that
T (x0) = inf{T > 0 : lim
t→T
x(t, x0) = 0,
x(t, x0) = 0 ∀t > T} (3)
where x(t, x0) denotes the state trajectory of system (2)
with the initial condition x0. It should be noted that for an
autonomous system x˙(t) = F (x(t)) to be FTS, it is necessary
that the function F (x) be non-Lipschitz at the equilibrium
point x = 0 [28], [29]. Example of non-Lipschitz functions
are sgn(x) or sgn(x)|x|a, 0 < a < 1.
Lemma 1. [28] Consider the autonomous system x˙(t) =
F (x(t)). Assume that there exist a continuously differentiable
function V , real numbers c > 0 and a ∈ (0, 1) such that
V (0) = 0, V (x) > 0, x ∈ V ⊂ Rn and
V˙ (x(t)) = ∇V (x(t))F (x(t)) ≤ −c(V (x(t))a, x ∈ V. (4)
Then, the origin is a finite-time stable equilibrium of the
system. Moreover, the settling-time function T (x0) is given
as:
T (x0) ≤ 1
c(1− a) (V (x0))
1−a.
Definition 2. [33] The closed-loop system (2) is locally finite-
time input-to-state stable with respect to the input signal e(t)
if for every x0 ∈ V ⊂ Rn, and every bounded input e(t) ∈ Rn
with ‖e‖∞ < ρ, we have
‖x(t)‖ ≤ β(‖x0‖, t) + γ¯
(
sup
0≤τ≤t
‖e(τ)‖) (5)
where γ¯ is a class K∞-function1 and β is a generalized KL-
function2 with β(‖x0‖, t) = 0 when t ≥ T with T as a
continuous function of x0.
It should be noted that the main difference between ISS and
FTISS is that for an ISS system, β(‖x0‖, t) → 0 as t → ∞,
while for FTISS system, β(‖x0‖, t) = 0 as t ≥ T with T <
∞.
1A function γ : R≥0 → R≥0 is of class K-function if it is continuous,
strictly increasing, and γ(0) = 0. Further, it is of class K∞-function if it is
also unbounded (γ(r)→∞ as r →∞).
2A function β : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0 is of class generalized KL-function
if β(., t) is of class K∞-function for all t and β(r, t) → 0 as t → T for
some T <∞.
3Definition 3. [34] A function V : V → R≥0 is called an
ISS-Lyapunov function for system (2), if there exist class K∞
functions α1, α2, α3, γ such that,
α1(‖x‖) ≤ V (x) ≤ α2(‖x‖), (6)
V˙ (x(t), e(t)) ≤ −α3(‖x(t)‖) + γ(‖e(t)‖).
for all x ∈ V .
Defining −α3(‖x(t)‖) ≤ −α3(α−11 (V (x(t)))) and
α3(α
−1
1 (x(t))) = α(x(t)), then condition (7) can be restated
as,
V˙ (x(t), e(t)) = ∇V (x(t)).F (x(t), e(t))
≤ −α(V (x(t))) + γ(‖e(t)‖). (7)
with α ∈ K∞.
Lemma 2. [35] System (2) is FTISS if there exists an ISS-
Lyapunov function such that in (7), α(V ) = O(V a) with 0 <
a < 1, i.e.
V˙ (x(t), e(t)) ≤ −cV a(x(t)) + γ(‖e(t)‖), ∀x ∈ V, (8)
with c > 0, and γ ∈ K∞.
B. Background on FTS and FTISS Systems
Finite-time stable (FTS) systems find application where
instead of typical asymptotic convergence, the finite-time
convergence is desired, see some applications in [30]. Such
models are particularly associated with non-smooth feedback
laws to stabilize systems which, otherwise, are unstabilizable
by smooth feedback. In this direction, system homogeneity is
a related concept and it is known that any stable homogeneous
system with negative homogeneity degree is FTS [36], [37].
For example, in [38] input-to-state stability of homogeneous
systems is studied for triggering control of nonlinear systems.
Homogeneous systems find applications in, e.g. sliding mode
control [39] and fixed-time stability [37] among others. Finite-
time stability was first studied in the optimal control literature
[31] and finite-time controllers generally result in a fast
response and high tracking precision as well as disturbance-
rejection properties due to their non-smoothness [33]. Simi-
larly, FTISS systems have the same privileges over the ISS
systems, including the finite-time convergence among others.
For better understanding of the ISS and FTISS systems and
their differences we refer interested readers to [33]–[35], [40],
[41]. Note that FTISS systems are comparatively less studied
in comparison with smooth systems and the literature is limited
to the mentioned references.
C. Control Objective
In this paper, we assume that the closed-loop system, in
an ideal continuous-time case, is FTISS. In this direction the
following assumption is made:
Assumption 1. For system (2), there exists an ISS-Lyapunov
function V : V → R≥0, which satisfies Lemma 2 for given
class K∞ functions α, γ, and constants 0 < a < 1, c > 0.
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Fig. 1. The block-diagram of the closed-loop system under DoS attack.
The block diagram of the considered networked control
system is shown in Fig.1 where the information exchange
between sensor/actuator and controller is done through com-
munication channels. In this paper, it is assumed that the
attacker can compromise the security of the communication
channels to inject DoS/DDoS attack. In the presence of
DoS/DDoS, the input u(t) is generated based on the most
recently received signal when no DoS was present. Then,
the problem is under what conditions on DoS attack the
closed-loop finite-time stability is preserved. In this paper, we
consider justified assumptions on the duration/frequency of
the DoS signal along with assumption to prevent finite escape
time in the system. Under these assumptions, borrowing ideas
from event-based control and FTISS Lyapunov functions, the
problem of interest is to develop an event-triggered control
such that in the presence of DoS attack, the closed-loop system
remains FTS and the inter-execution times of the controller
are bounded away from zero to avoid Zeno phenomena3. We
particularly derive the conditions on DoS attack such that,
using modified hybrid event-triggered mechanism, the system
remains FTS under DoS. It should be mentioned that we
assume all the entities in the considered networked control
system shown in Fig. 1 (i.e. plant, controller, sensor, and
actuator) perform their specified actions using some sort of
suitable user authentication schemes such as the ones given
in [42], [43]. However, it is assumed that the attacker can
still compromise the implemented authentication scheme and
launch DoS/DDoS attack on the networked control system
shown in Fig. 1 .
We summarize the problems in this paper as follows:
Problem 1: Development of a Zeno-free event-triggered
mechanism such that the closed-loop system remains FTS
without considering the DoS attack.
Problem 2: Extending the event-triggered mechanism ob-
tained in the first problem in the presence of DoS attack
and deriving an upper-bound relation on the frequency and
duration of DoS intervals such that the closed-loop system
remains FTS.
3The Zeno phenomenon (or Zeno behavior) refers to the phenomenon of
infinite number of events over a finite-time period. In this paper, and in general
control literature, the Zeno phenomenon implies infinite number of control
updates and sampling over finite-time.
4III. EVENT-TRIGGERED MECHANISM
In this section, Problem 1 is considered and an event-
triggered mechanism is developed such that the closed-loop
system remains FTS without considering the DoS attack. It
is also shown that the Zeno phenomena is almost excluded.
To propose our sampling scheme, we make the following
assumption in the paper.
Assumption 2. For x ∈ V , there exists µ > 0 such that
γ(4‖x‖) ≤ µαa1(‖x‖) where the functions α1 and γ are
defined in Definition 3 and V is a nonempty neighborhood
of the origin in Rn.
In the proposed event-triggered framework, the event in-
stants, denoted by tk, k = 0, 1, . . . , are generated based on
the following event-triggered mechanism:
tk+1 = inf{t > tk | γ(4‖e(t)‖) > c(1− λ)V a(x(t))}, (9)
with 0 < λ < 1, e(t) = x(tk) − x(t) and the Lyapunov
function V (x(t)) satisfies the FTISS condition in (8).
Lemma 3. The event-triggered mechanism (9) is almost
always Zeno-free.
Proof: Note that for tk < t < tk+1 we have γ(4‖e(t)‖) ≤
c(1− λ)V a(x(t)). It is known that any event-triggered mech-
anism for which the error is restricted to satisfy γ(‖e‖) ≤
Kσ(x) is Zeno-free wherever γ and σ−1 functions are Lip-
schitz [15]. Note that the Lipschitz continuity is a sufficient
condition for Zeno-freeness not a necessary condition. Since
the functions γ and V −a are Lipschitz almost everywhere, the
event-triggered mechanism (9) does not show Zeno behavior
almost everywhere.
Similar analysis as in the above proof is given in [44] to
prove the almost Zeno-freeness of an event-triggered scheme.
Theorem 1. The system (1) with sample-and-hold input
u(t) = ψ(x(tk)), t ∈ [tk, tk+1) under the event-triggering
mechanism (9) is FTS. Particularly, the Lyapunov function is
such that,
V (x(t))1−a ≤ V (x(tk))1−a − (1− a)ω1(t− tk) (10)
where ω1 = cλ and tk < t < tk+1.
Proof: Following Assumption 1, we have an ISS-
Lyapunov function such that V˙ (x(t), e(t)) ≤ −cV a(x(t)) +
γ(‖e(t)‖). Further, the event-triggering mechanism (9) implies
that for tk < t < tk+1 we have γ(4‖e(t)‖) ≤ c(1 −
λ)V a(x(t)). Since γ ∈ K∞, we have γ(‖e(t)‖) < γ(4‖e(t)‖)
and it follows that,
V˙ (x(t)) ≤− cV a(x(t)) + c(1− λ)V a(x(t))
≤− cλV a(x(t)), (11)
and hence, it can be concluded the closed-loop system is FTS.
Finally, by solving the ordinary differential inequality (11), it
follows that: ∫ V (x(t))
V (x(tk))
dV
V a
≤
∫ t
tk
−cλdt
V (x(t))1−a − V (x(tk))1−a
1− a ≤ −cλ(t− tk)
which leads to the inequality (10).
IV. FINITE-TIME STABILITY UNDER DENIAL-OF-SERVICE
In this section, the main result on the finite-time stability
under DoS attacks is provided which is defined as Problem
2. We first model the DoS, define related concepts and
assumptions, and then provide the sampling scheme such that
the system remains FTS.
Let {σn}n∈N0 denote the time sequences of the DoS oc-
currence and {τn}n∈N0 , τn > 0 denote the duration of the
n-th DoS on the input communication. Further, define Hn =
[σn, σn+τn) as the n-th DoS interval. Assume that during each
DoS time interval the actuator can either, (i) generate an input
based on the most recent control signal update, or (ii) generate
zero-input. The case of zero-input strategy for control of linear
systems under lossy links is considered in [45]. In this paper
we consider case (i). Define Θ(t) as the set of all time intervals
during which no DoS occurs, i.e. Θ(t) = [0, t] \⋃n∈N0{Hn}.
In the sample-and-hold scenario, we have u(t) = ψ(x(tk(t)))
where k(t) = sup{k ∈ N0|tk ∈ Θ(t)} denotes the last event
instant with successful data transmission over the network. In
order to characterize DoS, the following assumptions are made
over the interval [0, t).
Assumption 3. DoS frequency: For all t ≥ 0, there exist η ≥ 0
and τD > 0 such that, n(t) ≤ η + t/τD where n(t) denotes
the number of off/on DoS transitions in the interval [0, t).
Assumption 4. DoS duration: For all t ≥ 0, there exist
κ ≥ 0 and θ > 1 such that, |Ξ(t)| ≤ κ + t/θ where
Ξ(t) =
⋃
n∈N0{Hn} denotes the total interval of DoS over
[0, t).
It should be noted that τD bounds the average dwell-time
between two consecutive DoS intervals, see [46] for more
information. In fact, 1/τD is the upper-bound on the frequency
of off/on DoS transitions. Moreover, 1/θ is a measure of the
time fraction over which the DoS occurs, and therefore t/θ
can be interpreted as the average DoS duration.
Remark 1. The above assumptions on the DoS dura-
tion/frequency are practically motivated by the fact that there
are several techniques to mitigate DoS attacks, e.g. high-pass
filter and spreading methods. These mitigation techniques limit
the duration time and frequency of DoS intervals over which
input communication is denied [14] and justify Assumptions 3
and 4. As an example, the attack scenario in [24] considers
that out of N possible communications M < N are denied.
This is a special case of the assumptions in this paper, where
κ = 0, θ =∞ in Assumption 4, and η =M, τD = δMN with
some δ > 0 in Assumption 3 .
Considering Assumptions 1-4, the hybrid event-triggered
mechanism is proposed as follows:
• Case (I): if tk is not in a DoS interval, then the next event
instant is defined similar to (9) as,
tk+1 = inf{t > tk | γ(4‖e(t)‖) > c(1− λ)V a(x(t))} (12)
with 0 < λ < 1 and e(t) = x(tk(t))− x(t).
5• Case (II): if tk is in a DoS interval, then the next event
instant is defined such that for ∆k = tk+1 − tk we have
∆ ≤ ∆k ≤ ∆, where ∆ > 0 and ∆ > 0 are the
upper-bound and lower-bound of the inter-event interval,
respectively.
In the following, first it is shown that the proposed hybrid
event-triggering mechanism does not show Zeno behavior.
Lemma 4. The event-triggering mechanism defined by
Case (I)-(II) does not show Zeno behavior almost at every
point.
Proof: Note that the sampling during the DoS attack
(Case (II)) is lower-bounded by ∆ > 0. This along with
the proof of Lemma 3 imply that the hybrid event-triggering
mechanism is Zeno-free almost everywhere.
Lemma 5. Consider system (1) with feedback u(t) =
ψ(x(tk(t)))), t ∈ [tk, tk+1) under the event-triggering mecha-
nism Case (I)-(II). Then, if tk is in a DoS interval, it follows
that:
V 1−a(x(t)) ≤V 1−a(x(tk(tk)+1)))
+ (1− a)ω2(t− tk(tk)+1), (13)
where V is the ISS Lyapunov function defined in Assumption
1, ω2 = c(1− λ) + 2µ, and tk(tk)+1 < t < tk+1.4
Proof: Having tk in the DoS interval and following Case
(II), tk+1 = tk+∆k. Assuming that a successful event instant
k(tk) occurs before tk, it follows that:
‖e(t)‖ ≤ 1
4
γ−1
(
c(1− λ)V a(x(t))), tk(tk) ≤ t ≤ tk(tk)+1.
Following the continuity of V (x(t)), x(t), and e(t) at tk(tk)+1,
it follows that:
‖x(tk(tk))‖ ≤‖x(tk(tk)+1)‖+ ‖e(tk(tk)+1)‖
≤‖x(tk(tk)+1)‖+
1
4
γ−1
(
c(1− λ)V a(x(tk(tk)+1))
)
≤1
4
γ−1(µV a(x(tk(tk)+1)))
+
1
4
γ−1
(
c(1− λ)V a(x(tk(tk)+1))
)
, (14)
where the last inequality is written based on Assumption 2
and (6). Note that for γ as a K∞-class function and a, b ≥ 0
we have γ(a+ b) ≤ γ(2a) + γ(2b). Using this inequality for
e(t) = x(tk(tk))− x(t), tk(tk) ≤ t ≤ tk+1, it follows that:
γ(‖e(t)‖) ≤ γ(2‖x(tk(tk))‖) + γ(2‖x(t)‖)
≤ (c(1− λ) + µ)V a(x(tk(tk)+1)) + µV a(x(t)).
Consequently, it follows from (8) that
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ (c(1− λ) + µ)V a(x(tk(tk)+1)) + (µ− λ)V a(x(t))
≤ ω2 max{V a(x(tk(tk)+1))), V a(x(t))}, (15)
for tk(tk)+1 ≤ t < tk+1. Finally, in order to solve the
differential inequality (15), consider the differential equation
v˙(t) = ω2 max{va(x(tk(tk)+1))), va(x(t))} over tk(tk)+1 ≤
4Note that tk(tk)+1 denotes the first possible sampling time-instant that is
included in the DoS time interval occurring after tk .
t < tk+1 with the initial condition v(tk(tk)+1) = V (tk(tk)+1).
It follows that
v(t) =
(
v1−a(tk(tk)+1) + ω2(t− tk(tk)+1)
) 1
1−a ,
and using the comparison lemma, we have V (t) ≤ v(t) which
leads to (13).
Remark 2. Lemma 5 quantifies the rate of divergence of
the Lyapunov function in the sense that, in the presence of
DoS and no successful feedback, the Lyapunov function may
increase while the growth value is upper-bounded as in (13).
Let Λ(t) represents the union of the time-intervals over
which the Lyapunov function V (x(t)) may increase. Further,
define Λc(t) as the complement of Λ(t) over the time-interval
[0, t), i.e., Λc(t) = [0, t) \ Λ(t). Following Assumptions 3
and 4 on the DoS frequency/duration, it follows that [19]:
|Λ(t)| ≤ κ+ t
θ
+ ∆(η +
t
τD
). (16)
Following Theorem 2 and Lemma 5, it follows from (10) and
(13) that
V 1−a(x(t)) ≤ V 1−a0
+ (1− a)(ω2|Λ(t)| − ω1|Λc(t)|). (17)
In the above, the DoS-related term may increase the Lyapunov
function (causing instability), while the other term decreases
the Lyapunov function (causing stability). The goal is to
determine the conditions on the DoS frequency/duration such
that the stabilizing term is predominant and, therefore, the
closed-loop system remains FTS.
Theorem 2. Consider system (1) with input feedback u(t) =
ψ(x(tk(t))) under event-triggered mechanism Case (I)-(II) and
Assumptions 2, 3, and 4. The system is FTS, if
1
θ
+
∆
τD
<
cλ
c+ 2µ
. (18)
Furthermore,
‖x(t)‖ ≤ α−11
((
α2(‖x0‖)1−a + (1− a)(ρ− ξt)
) 1
1−a
)
, (19)
where,
ξ := cλ−
(
1
θ
+
∆
τD
)
(c+ 2µ),
ρ := (c+ 2µ)(κ+ ∆η).
Proof: First, it follows from (16) that:
ω2|Λ(t)| − ω1|Λc(t)| = (c+ 2µ)(κ+ ∆η)
+ t
((
1
θ
+
∆
τD
)
(c+ 2µ)− cλ
)
= ρ− ξt.
Then, based on the condition (18), we have ξ > 0 and it
follows from (17) that
V 1−a(x(t)) ≤ V 1−a0 + (1− a)(ρ− ξt),
which guarantees finite-time stability. Moreover, the settling-
time is upper-bounded as:
T (x0) ≤ V
1−a
0 + (1− a)ρ
ξ
6The second part of the theorem follows from equations (6),
(16), and (17) as,
α1(‖x‖) ≤ V (x(t)),
V 1−a(x(t)) ≤ V 1−a0 + (1− a)(ρ− ξt),
V0 ≤ α2(‖x(0)‖),
and we have,
α1−a1 (‖x(t)‖) ≤ α1−a2 (‖x(0)‖) + (1− a)(ρ− ξt),
which leads to (19).
V. SIMULATION STUDY
Consider a nonlinear system in the form:
x˙(t) = −sgn(x(t))|x(t)| 12 + x(t) + u(t), (20)
with the event-triggered control input u(t) = ψ(x(tk(t))) =
−2x(tk(t)) = −2(x(t) + e(t)) and the Lyapunov function as
V (x(t)) = x2(t). Then, it follows that
V˙ (x(t), e(t)) = 2x(t)(−sgn(x(t))|x(t)| 12 − 2x(t)− 2e(t))
= −2|x(t)| 32 − 2x2(t)− 4x(t)e(t). (21)
Next, by using the Young’s inequality for the term x(t)e(t) it
follows that:
V˙ (x(t), e(t)) ≤ −2|x(t)| 32 − 2x2(t) + 2x2(t) + 2e2(t)
≤ −2|x(t)| 32 + 2e2(t)
≤ −2V 34 (t) + 2e2(t).
Following (8), we have c = 2, a = 34 , and γ(r) = 2r
2 which
implies that the system is FTISS from Lemma 2. Hence, by
selecting λ = 0.5, the event-triggered condition (9) is given
as:
tk+1 = inf{t > tk | 32e2(t) > |x(t)|1.5}. (22)
Figure 2 shows the state trajectory of system (20) with the
proposed event-triggered mechanism (22). As shown in this
figure, the state x(t) converges to zero in a finite-time and the
total number events in this scenario is 40. Moreover, no data
is sent through the network after t = 2.03 which is due to the
finite-time convergence property of the closed-loop system. In
comparison with the time-triggered network communication
with the sampling time T = 0.02, the number of data exchange
in 5 seconds is reduced from 250 samples in the time-triggered
fashion to 40 ones in the proposed event-triggered scheme
which shows a significant reduction in the communication
between the plant and the controller.
Next, the performance of the proposed event-triggering
scheme in the presence of DoS attack is demonstrated. It
follows from (6) that α1(r) = r2 and α2(r) = 3r2. Therefore,
for |x| < 3, any µ ≥ 55.43 satisfies Assumption 2 and the
hybrid event-triggered mechanism (22) with ∆k = ∆ = 0.1 is
selected. Using these parameters in Theorem 2, one can find
an upper-bound on frequency/duration of DoS intervals under
which the system is guaranteed to remain FTS as follows:
1
θ
+
0.1
τD
<
1
112.86
≈ 0.00886. (23)
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Fig. 2. The state trajectory corresponding to x(0) = 3 without DoS attack.
Solid blue line: state evolution, Red bars: the event-time instant tk .
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Fig. 3. The inter-event interval tk+1 − tk in the presence of DoS attacks.
The vertical gray stripes represent the DoS time-intervals.
It should be noted that this bound is conservative and can
in practice be larger than the theoretical one. The same
observation is reported in [19] and this is mainly due to the fact
that the condition in Assumption 2 bounds the derivative of
the Lyapunov function irrespective of the specific nonlinear
system. In other words, the bound in (23) holds for any
nonlinear system for which the Lyapunov function satisfies
similar condition as in Assumption 2.
Remark 3. The bound in (23) depends on the parameters
µ, λ, and ∆k which can be determined by the designer. This
implies that the designer can potentially tune the parameters
to manage, for example, the convergence performance or the
communication rate based on the existing resources. Further,
the control input u(t) can be designed for different purposes,
for example, for robustness against disturbances. These pro-
vide desirable design flexibility for several implementation
options.
For numerical simulation, as shown Fig. 3, we randomly
generate DoS attack with the frequency and duration of
n(5) = 7 and Ξ(5) ' 4, respectively, in the time-interval
[0, 5]. This figure particularly represents the outcome of the
proposed hybrid event-triggered mechansim, where during the
off-periods of DoS (Case (I)), the event-triggered condition
(22) is used and during the DoS attack, we have ∆k = 0.1.
The average duty cycle of DoS signal is approximately 80%,
implying 80% denial of input transmissions over time (in
average). Figures 4 and 5 show the state trajectory x(t) and
the corresponding error trajectory e(t) of the proposed hybrid
event-triggered mechanism. As shown in Figure 4, the state
of the system converges to zero in a finite-time and the total
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Fig. 4. The state trajectory corresponding to x(0) = 3 in the presence of DoS
attacks. Solid blue line: state evolution, Red bars: the event-time instant tk .
The vertical gray stripes in the background represent the DoS time-intervals.
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Fig. 5. The error trajectory e(t) corresponding to x(0) = 3 in the presence
of DoS attacks. The vertical gray stripes represent the DoS time-intervals.
number events in this scenario is 68 which as expected is
more than the previous case corresponding to no DoS attack.
However, even in the presence of DoS attack, the number
of event is much less than the time-triggered communication
mechanism. Figure 5 shows the time evolution of the error
signal e(t) and as expected during the DoS attack, due to the
denial of data exchange, the error signal increases while after
the removal of DoS, it returns back to zero.
For comparison, the zero-input strategy proposed in [45]
is also simulated and the state trajectory of our proposed
approach as well as the one in [45] are shown in Fig. 6.
Following the proposed strategy, during the DoS intervals,
the input is constant and equal to the most recent control
signal updated during no-DoS interval. A different strategy
is proposed in [45] by considering zero-input during the DoS
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Proposed strategy
Zero-input strategy
Fig. 6. The state trajectory corresponding to x(0) = 3 in the presence of
DoS attacks (represented by gray stripes). Blue solid line: proposed approach,
Black dashed line: zero-input strategy [45].
intervals. As it can be seen from Fig. 6, the proposed event-
triggered mechanism under DoS (with input transmission
denial over 80% of the simulation time) successfully stabilizes
the system (20) in a finite-time and it outperforms the zero-
input strategy [45] which is not necessarily stable as shown in
Fig. 6. As the final comment, note that the problem of the FTS
and FTISS systems under DoS is to great extent unexplored in
the literature and there is no other paper specifically discussing
this topic for the sake of comparison.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, finite-time stabilizing control under denial-
of-service attack on input transmissions is considered. The
interest in FTS systems has recently been increased due to their
decreased response time, for example, in robotic applications.
The practical results given on FTISS and FTS systems and
related Lyapunov analysis alleviate the technicality for non-
smooth feedback design. We particularly relate the dura-
tion/frequency of DoS attack to finite-time stability where no
assumption on the information available to the DoS attacker
regarding the sampling logic, underlying nonlinear system,
and control input is considered. We propose an event-based
sampling logic which is flexible in terms of design parameters,
allowing to account for, e.g., limitations in communication
resources. Note that various control methods may be applied
for finite-time stability of the underlying system as our resilient
sampling does not impose any constraint on the input.
It should be mentioned that, during DoS attack one can
either apply the zero-input or the last updated input to the
system. As discussed in the simulation section, using the last
updated input outperforms the zero-input strategy as zero-
input is generally destabilizing for general open-loop unstable
systems. Even if the attacker is intelligent, since the underlying
system is generally unstable, zero input has no better effect
than using the last updated input. Note that, during DoS the
controller cannot update the input therefore the zero input
implies complying with the attacker which in turn result in
instability. Therefore, during the DoS interval there is no better
strategy than using the last updated input signal. In general,
the optimality criteria for the superiority of the either of the
two strategies only can be defined when the probability of
DoS attacks (or lossy links, packet loss, failed data) is known
[45]. However, in this paper as discussed in the introduction
it is assumed that the DoS attacks do not follow a specific
probability distribution. Therefore, no optimality criteria can
be considered as the DoS attacks are unpredictable. One may
consider a game-theoretic approach for the cyber defender if
the intelligent attacker follows a specific pattern (or game) and
this can be considered as one of the future research directions.
Future research are considered in the following directions.
Self-triggering sampling methods [38] based on the predic-
tion of system state could be applied, for example, in case
of asynchronous denial of measurement and input channels.
Extension to distributed control application [47] is another
promising direction of research and finally finite-time control
methods based on the sign function and communicating single-
bit of information [29], [30] under DoS is another interesting
application.
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